In the current paper we present an instrumental approach to deception. This approach incorporates the notion that bargainers (a) will use deception as a means to reach their goals in bargaining but (b) will refrain from using deception when they have alternative means to reach their goals. We demonstrate that different goals can lead to differences in the use of deception (Experiment 1). Furthermore, we demonstrate that reactions to deceit can also be understood from an instrumental perspective (Experiment 2).

ABSTRACTHumiliation lacks an empirically derived definition, sometimes simply being equated with shame. We approached the conceptualisation of humiliation from a prototype perspective, identifying 61 features of humiliation, some of which are more central to humiliation than others. Prototypical humiliation involved feeling powerless, small, and inferior in a situation in which one was brought down and in which an audience was present, leading the person to appraise the situation as unfair and resulting in a mix of emotions, most notably disappointment, anger, (...) and shame. Some of the features overlapped with those of shame whereas other features overlapped with those of anger. Which specific features are present may determine whether the humiliation experience becomes more shame- or anger-like. (shrink)